This week we talk about protectionist policy, solar panels, and rare earths.
We also discuss Chinese business investment, EVs, and extreme weather events.
Recommended Book: Meet Me By the Fountain by Alexandra Lange
Transcript
The Great Green Wall—the one in China, not the one meant to span the Sahel region, straddling the upper portion of Africa—is officially called the Three-North Shelter Forest Program, and was initially implemented by the Chinese government in 1978.
This program is scheduled to be completed sometime mid-century, around 2050, and its purpose is to keep the Gobi Desert, which spans the lower portion of Mongolia and part of China's northern border, from expanding, which is something large deserts otherwise tend to do through a collection of natural, but often human-amplified processes called aeolian desertification.
The Gobi currently gobbles up about 1,400 square miles, which is around 3,600 square km, of Chinese grassland every year, as dust storms that roll through the area blow away topsoil that allows grasses and other plants to survive. And those storms become more powerful as the climate shifts, and as more grassland is turned to desert, giving the winds more leeway, fewer things keeping them from blowing hard and scooping up more soil, and as the roots of the plants on the fringes of the desert dry up, which usually keep the soil in place, become newly exposed to these influences, withering, their roots holding things together less tight than before, the process continuing to move ever outward.
Around a quarter of China's total landmass is already desert, and while there are a number of other causes of the country's desertification, including coastal erosion and the incursion of salty water into otherwise freshwater areas, this type, aeolian desertification, is one that they can tackle somewhat directly, if still at great expense and with muddled levels of success.
So the Great Green Wall of China is meant to stop that desertification, it is a potential means of tackling this issue, and it does this by keeping those winds from blowing away the topsoil, and over time is meant to help reclaim areas that have been turned into desert by this collection of processes.
And those in charge of this program do this by basically planting a huge number of trees, creating sturdier root systems to keep soil from blowing away, blocking the winds, and over time, the trees are meant to help new ecosystems grow in areas that have been previously diminished; holding everything together, soil-wise, but also adding nutrients to the ground as their leaves fall; those natural processes slowly reestablishing new layers of productive soil.
The area they're attempting to swathe with newly planted trees is huge, and by that 2050 end date, it's anticipated that they'll need to plant something like 88 million acres of forests across a belt of land that's about 3,000 miles wide and nearly 900 miles deep in some areas.
Local governments that have been largely tasked with making all this happen in their jurisdictions have claimed some successes in this ambition over the years, though one of the biggest criticisms leveled against those same governments is that they often spend a lot of time and money planting large swathes of trees, stabilizing some areas for a time, but then they fail to maintain those forests, so they more or less disappear within just a few years.
This can actually leave some of the afflicted areas worse off than they would have otherwise been, as some of these trees are essentially invasive species, not optimized for the local conditions, and they consume more water than is available, gobbling up resources other plants need to spring up around them, and they thus blight the areas they're meant to enrich, killing off the smaller plantlife, not supporting and expanding it, and then they die because they're undernourished, themselves.
While China plants more trees than the rest of the world, combined, due to this and similar projects, then, the system underpinning all of this planting isn't typically optimized for long-term success, and it often succumbs to the needs of local politicians, not the desired outcomes of the program, overall.
Also, in the cases where the forests are sustained longer-term, they often to create monocultures that are more akin to plantations than forests, which makes them more susceptible to disease—like the one that killed more than a billion poplar trees that were planted in Northwestern China in 2000, leading to a 20-year-or-so setback in the program—and that also makes them faster-growing, but less effective as carbon sinks than slower-growth versions of the same; they get big faster, but they don't absorb and store as much CO2 as other trees options would.
The forests they've planted that have sustained for more than a few years have periodically served as giant carbon sinks, though, pulling down as much as 5% of the country's total industrial CO2 emissions from 1978 to 2017, which is a pretty big deal for a country with such a huge volume of such emissions.
That said, it's still an open question as to whether this Great Green Wall will do what it's meant to do, by 2050 or ever, as while the concept is solid by some estimations, its implementation has been uneven at best, and it seems to be plagued by short-term thinking and metrics of success that don't line up with the stated purpose of the program.
What I'd like to talk about today is the implementation of what's being called, in some economic circles at least, a new Great Green Wall, this one around China and its exports, especially renewable energy exports, by the US and its allies, at a moment in which those sorts of exports are both highly desirable, and arguably, highly necessary.
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The International Energy Agency recently said it expects to see about $2 trillion-worth of clean energy investments, globally, in 2024 alone.
This spending is partly the consequence of the $13 billion in damage China sustained from natural disasters in January to June of this year, and the something like $37.9 billion in damages the US suffered from just the 15 most damaging storms it saw during the same period, not inclusive of all the other ones.
Nations around the world are paying out gobs of money in the aftermath of increasingly brutal weather disasters, and that's on top of the slower-moving devastation that's being caused by the impacts of the climate shifting, messing with everything from crops to water cycles to where people can afford to live, because insurance companies are wholesale pulling out of some areas, and the cost of rebuilding over and over again in the same, previously habitable areas, just isn't worth it any more.
While there's still some political and ideological opposition to the concept of climate change, then, even some of the folks who are vehemently against the concept, publicly, are privately investing huge sums of money in infrastructure meant to help them survive and thrive in a future in which the climate has changed, and that includes things like sea walls and buildings that are cooler, passively, allowing more airflow and reflecting sunlight rather than absorbing it, but we're also seeing surges of investment in renewable energy sources, as they don't further contribute to the issue of climate change, but also because they come with a slew of advantages over fossil fuel based versions of the same; hence, that $2 trillion clean energy spending in 2024, compared to the estimated $1 trillion for fossil fuel-based energy sources the same year.
In May of 2024, US President Biden announced a near-future wave of tariff increases on a slew of Chinese goods, especially those related to the renewable energy transition.
For those aforementioned reasons, alongside a bunch of economic ones, as renewables are cheaper over time than fossil fuels, it's expected by essentially everyone that the planet will largely shift to renewable energy sources this century, with many governments hoping to make the transition entirely or almost entirely by 2050, with some nations that are moving more slowly, because of issues related to existing infrastructure, population, or poverty, arriving sometime in the 2070s or 2080s.
Thus, whomever owns the industries that will be relevant in that future—electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, and so on—they will be something like the new oil giants of the latter-half of the century, and beyond, massively enriched because they're the ones that allow everyone to generate energy in this new reality.
Making those sorts of investments now, then, in terms of manufacturing capacity, but also the knowledge and trade secrets and brands and supply chains that get those products to the world, may yield incredible dividends for those willing to make them.
And at the moment, as of mid-2024, China is by far the king of the hill when it comes to pretty much every component of this transition, dominating the world's output of solar panels, EVs, wind turbine blades, batteries, and rare earth metals that are currently fundamental to the making of basically all of those things, while also owning some of the most valuable intellectual property, developing some of the most vital innovations, and controlling the most active, resilient, and competitive supply chains that make them available, globally.
The push by the Chinese government to own these spaces began in earnest in 2009, when it started providing subsidies to companies that were willing to invest in and start producing electric vehicles and accompanying technologies, and that successful effort has allowed the country to leapfrog other countries, like the US, which by some measures had a leading advantage up till that point because of other capacities and investments, and which has long served as the home bases of traditional car companies, and exciting new brands like Tesla and other startups that were beginning to gobble up global market share.
The Chinese government poured tens of billions of dollars into tax breaks and subsidies, though, and that helped stoke a highly competitive market that's led to the development of ultra-cheap electric vehicles, which are now outselling rivals in almost every market they've entered.
This effect is perhaps even more pronounced when we look at solar panels and batteries.
Chinese exports of these goods have easily outpaced and outcompeted rival producers overseas, and that's, combined with demand on the local, Chinese market, has pulled the price of solar panels from about $126 per watt in 1975 all the way down to about 26 cents per watt in 2022.
Over that period, these panels have become more efficient and effective, more resilient, and more useful—reshapable to fit more use-cases.
And the concomitant drop in lithium-ion battery prices, down about 97% since 1991 due to similar economic variables, has made solar even more useful and in demand, as solar setups are usually, these days, connected to battery backup systems that allow the panels to capture sunlight during the day and to stockpile that energy for later, when the sun isn't shining, ameliorating one of the biggest and most common concerns about solar power at the individual home scale, but also at the utility, city-sized scale; that it's an intermittent source. Attaching a battery, though, makes it a consistent source of power, that's also incredibly, and increasingly, inexpensive compared to other options offering similar levels of power.
That's been a major contributor to the expansion of solar installations, and recent innovations in the development of alternative, non-lithium-based batteries could do the same, as some novel battery types, like sodium-ion batteries, use a similar setup as their lithium counterparts, but without the issues associated with mining lithium, and with a better power-to-weight ratio, much lower fire risk, and lower theoretical expense, and flow batteries, made from iron, salt, and water, which are a lot worse than lithium ion batteries in essentially every practical regard, are just silly cheap and incredibly resilient, and thus could be built and deployed essentially everywhere—into the walls of homes and other buildings, into driveways and roads, everywhere—providing widespread, low-grade energy backup to whole cities at a very low cost.
So all of these products are already in high demand, and that demand is just expected to grow as these things continue to get better and cheaper.
China owns the majority of the best companies in these spaces, and makes the best, cheapest versions of these products.
Biden's recently announced tariff increases are an example of what're called protectionist monetary policy, the idea being to make competing products from elsewhere, like China, more expensive, by requiring folks pay another 25-100% of the product's price in tariffs, which in practice can double the price of these goods, which in turn makes locally produced goods, or those produced in allied countries, like in Europe, more competitive, despite not actually being competitive 1-on-1, without these policies in place.
The argument for this type of policy is that while on some level it could be beneficial to have these high quality, cheap Chinese solar panels and batteries flooding into the US market in the short-term, as it would help companies shift to clean energy sources faster than would otherwise be possible, in the long-term it would allow China to own those spaces, killing off all US-based competition in these industries, which would make the US economy, and by association all US businesses and people, and the US government, reliant on China, and a constant flow of such goods.
That would mean China would have a permanent whammy on the US because if they ever wanted to invade Taiwan, for instance, and keep the US off their back, they could just say, hey, let us do what we want to do, or we'll stop sending you solar panels and batteries, and we'll stop providing support for the ones you already have, which would devastate the US, because that would be equivalent to what happened when OPEC stopped exporting oil to the US in the 1970s—it was brutal, and we've only become more reliant on cheap, abundant energy in the decades since.
And that's on top of concerns that China, if it owned all the infrastructure related to these technologies top to bottom, which they kind of do, they would also conceivably have all sorts of potential backdoors into the US electrical grid, giving them the ability to shut things down or cause other sorts of havoc in the event of a conflict.
So while these are kind of just theoretical concerns at the moment, the risks associated of becoming reliant on one country, and one run by an authoritarian government that isn't the biggest fan of the US and its allies, controlling all aspects of a nations energy capacity in that way are substantial enough that the US government seems to think it's worth taking a hit in the short-term to avoid that potential future.
This situation in which short-term loss is necessary to avoid long-term energy dominance by China is arguably a problem of the US and other wealthy governments' own making, as again, China started wholeheartedly investing in these technologies back in 2009, and the US and Europe and other entities that are trying to play catch up, now, didn't make the same bet at the same scale, and that's a big part of why they're so far behind, scrambling to figure out how to catch up, and how to avoid having all their own solar and battery and EV companies killed off in the meantime.
Some of these governments are doing what they can, now, to pick up the pace, Biden's Inflation Reduction Act and Infrastructure Act, for instance, shoring up these sorts of businesses and seeding potential next-step technologies—but again, these and similar efforts are more than a decade behind the same in China, and the Chinese government often entangles itself more directly with Chinese businesses than Western governments are conformable attempting with their own versions of the same, so Chinese businesses have that additional entanglemented-related leg-up, as well.
There's an argument to be made, then, that while these tariffs—in the US and otherwise—are almost certainly at least a little bit performative, for political purposes, and at least a little bit reactive, in the sense that they attempt to reframe Chinese superiority within these spaces as unfair, rather than the winnings associated with making different, and ultimately better bets than other governments back in the day, there's an argument to be made that this is one of the only ways to prevent Chinese companies from killing off all their foreign competition, locking themselves in as the makers of solar panels and wind turbines and battery backup systems and electric vehicles, and more or less owning that component of the future, which—because of how fundamental electricity is already, and how much more fundamental it's becoming as more nations segue away from fossil fuels as primary energy sources—means they have a slew of adjacent industries in an economic headlock, as well. Arguably the whole of every economy on the planet.
Attempts to label one side good and pure and the other a malicious economic actor may be just set dressing, then, and the real story is how one side managed to lock-in a true advantage for themselves, while their competitors are scrambling at the 11th hour to figure out a way to dilute that advantage, and maybe grab something of the same for themselves.
Biden's attempt, here, and similar policies elsewhere—especially Europe, but we're seeing some protectionist ideas flutter to the surface in other nations, as well, most of them aimed specifically at China—is meant to give competitors time to catch up. And many of them use a stick approach, increasing the price of these goods on foreign markets, while others are carrots, offering subsidies for locally made panels and EVs, for instance, but only if their key components are made in friendly countries; so Chinese-made vehicles don't benefit from those subsidies, but those manufactured elsewhere often do.
Some businesses in tariffed areas are bypassing, or attempting to bypass these concerns by making licensing deals with, for instance, Chinese battery giant CATL, which makes the world's best and cheapest batteries, and which US-based Ford and Tesla have been dealing with in ways that they all claim still work, legally, under the new policy system.
Other countries, like Brazil and Chile in South America, and Hungary and Germany in Europe, have been making deals to attract Chinese foreign direct investment within their borders, basically having Chinese companies build offshoots in their territory so they can benefit from the additional job creation and local know-how, and in both cases the idea is to dodge these policies, still benefitting from relationships with Chinese companies but in ways that allow them to avoid the worst of those sticks, even if they don't always benefit from the carrots.
China, for its part, has been investing in reinforcing its global supply chains against these sorts of tariffs for years, especially following former US President Trump's decision to begin disentangling the US and China when he was in office, which caught a lot of businesses and governments off guard at the time.
In the years since, Chinese officials have been moving things around so that many of their supply chains end in third countries before headed to US and European markets, giving them backdoor access to those markets without suffering the full impact of those amplified tariffs.
This is just a riff on an existing strategy, as China did the same with their solar panels back in the industry's relatively early days of the 2010s, rerouting their panels through Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam and Cambodia to avoid tariffs, which is part of why something like 80% of the US's solar panels still come from these countries, today: they're Chinese panels, in most of the ways that matter, but those buying and selling them can claim otherwise for tariff purposes.
Now, China is developing the capacity to build their EVs in Mexico, before then shipping them to tariff-defended countries around the world, including the US to the north, and Chinese-mined and refined rare earths, which are necessary components for batteries and other such technologies, are being mined in and diverted through a variety of different countries, their origins visible but still obfuscated for legal, tariff-related purposes.
The US and its allies are beginning to insist that other trade partners implement similar tariffs against China when it comes to these sorts of products, but results have been hit and miss on that front so far, and it could be that, even though this sort of trade war stance has been ongoing for nearly a decade at this point, policies related to these increasingly vital goods will be what finally fractures the global economy into rival collections of supply chains and viable markets, smaller countries forced to choose between dealing with the US and other Western nations on one hand, and China and its allies on the other.
Of course, again, intensifying weather events and the changing climate is stressing a lot of infrastructure and causing a lot of damage, globally, which is making the shift to renewables an increasingly pressing need.
At some point that need could strain or break existing relationships, depending on who ends up wielding the most leverage in this regard, and that in turn could contribute to the ongoing and substantial realignment we're seeing in the global world order that has determined how things work, economically and legally and militarily, for the better part of the past century.
Show Notes
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-pv-prices
https://ourworldindata.org/battery-price-decline
https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/02/21/1068880/how-did-china-dominate-electric-cars-policy
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/us-trade-representative-katherine-tai-take-further-action-china-tariffs-after-releasing-statutory
https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/great-green-wall/
https://archive.ph/MxOTZ
https://www.trade.gov/commerce-initiates-antidumping-and-countervailing-duty-investigations-crystalline-silicon
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/natural-disasters-china-caused-13-bln-economic-loss-january-june-2024-07-12/
https://knowablemagazine.org/content/article/society/2023/abandon-idea-great-green-walls
https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-us-fusion-race-4452d3be
https://asiatimes.com/2024/07/chinas-subsidies-create-not-destroy-value/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/09/china-floods-climate-change/
https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/iea-expects-global-clean-energy-investment-hit-2-trillion-2024-2024-06-06/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Green_Wall_(China)
https://phys.org/news/2023-10-china-great-green-wall-boosts.html
https://earth.org/what-is-the-great-green-wall-in-china/
The Great Green Wall